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Summary
Paint Industry and EnviroÍrmental Policy
An inquiry into the determinants and fficts of preventive poliq measures
directed at paint fadortes
1 Introduction
Prevention is one of the leading principles in current Dutch environmental
policy. This study focuses on the effects of policy instruments that are aimed
at prevention. The two main questions that we have raised were:
how can differences between factories in success
policy measures be explained?
how can differences between policy instruments
preventive policy measures be explained?
or failure of preventive
in success or failure of
The main focus of the analysis is on the concept of compliance to behavioural
prescriptions concerning the environment and not, as might be expected, on the
effectiveness or the change in environmental quality. Research on change in
environmental quality, as caused by policy measures, poses a number of diffi-
culties. First of all, there always is a great deal of uncertainty about whether
the observed levels of environmental quality could have been reached without
the policy measures. Secondly, it seldom is possible to attribute the change in
environmental quality to the behaviour of individual factories. However, by
assuming that there is a direct and linear relation between the level of compli-
ance and the effectiveness of the instrument, it is possible to exclude the envi-
ronmental quality from the analysis without losing too much information about
ttre degree of success of a policy instrument.
2 Model
Our dependent variable is compliance, which can be defined as the behaviour
by actors that conforms to the requirements of behavioural prescriptions (or
policy instruments). The research model can be used to answer questions on
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two levels. First of all, it identifies causes of differences in compliance levels
between actors. Secondly it explains differences in compliance levels of actors
between certain types of behavioural prescriptions and policy instruments.
Variance in the dependent variable, compliance, is explained by four groups of
variables: acceptance, implementation, characteristics of the firm and character-
istics of the instrument. The last variable group is only used at the level of
variance between policy instruments.
In order to explain differences in compliance levels between actors (factories),
the model assumes that compliance is reached under three conditions. First, to
reach compliance it is necessary the actor is aware of positive effects of compli-
ance in terms of economic or technical feasibility of the behavioural prescrip-
tions, audits or sanctions, the environmental quality, the company image, or the
factories market position. Second, for compliance it is necessary the behaviour-
al prescription is carried out properly. This means, for example, the target
group must be informed about the content and the status of the behavioural
prescription, and complying behaviour of the target group must be audited by
the agency carrying out the instrument. Third, it is expected several firm char-
acteristics, such as firm size, profitability and firm location can affect compli-
ance levels. On the strength of the information available when the model was
drawn up, the relationship between firm size and compliance level appeared
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is evidence that big factories may have
higher compliance levels because they have more resources available to com-
ply. On the other hand, some authors stated these resources can also be used
to successfully avoid compliance. Because of this inconclusiveness both expec-
tations were tested: first, firm size has a positive relation with compliance; sec-
ond and reverse, the relation between firm size and compliance is a negative
one. Furthermore, it is expected profitability correlates positively with compli-
ance. Profits create more opportunities for complying with behavioural rules:
a firm can invest spare money for complying with behavioural rules. Location
is also a difficult but important variable. A distinction was made between fac-
tories at safe sites (for instance in industrial zones) and factories at unsafe sites
(for instance in cities). The main expectation was these types of firms may
differ in compliance because of differences in environmental pressure, The
direction of this relation was unclear, so we decided to test the null hypothesis.
Thus, the main hypothesis states compliance, the dependent variable, is medi-
ated by the degree of acceptance of the rule, the quality of implementation and
firm characteristics.
The second main hypothesis focuses on the question whether instrument A is
more effective than instrument B, when certain conditions are held constant,
r l i l r e u r c c h t
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Answering this type of question asks for experimental research. In this case that
is impossible. ' l 'herefore a cross-czrse design has been chosen: a field study of
the efl-ectiveuess of Íour policy instruments. By conccntrating the case study on
one specific target group is was possible to keep constant certain intervening
variablcs such as structure of targetgl'oup, product- and process cliaracteristics
CtC.
Threc characteristics of policy instruments werc tested: binding capabil ity, the
degree of norm-internalization and the quality of the policy-thcory. It was
cxpected that instr-uments wi th a high binding capabi l i ty ,  a high degree of
internalization and a good policy theory would give highcr conrpliance lo'cls
tl iau instrurnents with a low binding capabil ity, a low degree of internalization
and a bad policy theory. To test this hypothesis a distinction was made betwcen
conrpulsory and non-compulsory instruments. The fornrcr arc directly or indi-
rectly dcpcnding ort a law, and thc lattcr not. Non-conrpulsory instruments havc
ii voluntarl, basis, conrpulsory instruments not. Compulsory instrurnents werc
expectcd to havc relativcly low binding capabil it ics and a lower degree o1-
intcntal izat ion.  ' I l ie qual i ty of  the pol icy theory was expectcd to be higher Íor
i r tstrunrents on voluntarv basis.
3 The survey
The main survey Íbcused on the compliance oÍ- paint factories with the
behavioural  prescr ipt ions o1' lour environmental  pol icy instruments:  the cnviron-
mental permit. the cnvironmental audit, the ban on the use o1'cadmium and the
subsidy for  a new kind of  paint .  ' l 'he survcy covered 69 oÍ ' the 96 Dutch paint
l 'actories. The sample includcs about 70 percent of all Dutch paint factories.
Ti t is  is  a l 'eprest :ntat ive scgment oI  thc total  populat ion oÍ '  paint  factor ies.  l t
must bc statcd the oblective was not to take a sanrplc represeltt ing the t<ttal
population o1'Dutch industry, On the other hand, t l ie Dutch ecolloll ly is donri-
natcd by nrcdium and small sized l ' irrns. of which the Dutch paint industrl,
tornis a good example.
Two secondary surve),s were carried out. The first survey was cclnducted
anlons local agcncics issuing environmental perrnits íbr 89 of' the 96 paint
l.actories ([lrc response was approximatcly 90 percent). Although it was nor our
purposc to draw e representative sample of all local agencies that carry out t l ie
pennit. t l tcrc is cvidence that on two oÍ'the threc indicators the sanrplc nrcets
the character ist ics of  the total  populat ion.  Ncvcrtheless.  the l ' indrngs for the
sanrple ol  local  agcnclcs cannol  be gcncrahzed to the populat ion as a whole.  In
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Summary: Paint Industry and Environmental Policy
5 The Environmental Permit
The environmental permit is a compulsory kind of instrument that focuses
mainly on the production process. Every paint factory is obliged to have a
permit. The permit itself may contain dozens of behavioural prescriptions
concerning a variety of subjects and hazards such as preventing fire,
explosions, excessive noise, soil contamination, air emissions and water pollu-
tion. Environmental permits for paint factories are mostly issued by local auth-
orities.
Our conclusions about the effectiveness of the permit can be summarized in
four statements. First, compliance. Almost every paint factory has a permit.
The problem is, only about 60 percent of the factories complies with all the
behavioural prescriptions in the permit. A substantial group of factories only
partially complies with the permit. Furthermore, a large number of factories is
not very active in reporting changes in the permit-situation. This causes diffi-
culties in enforcing and updating the permits. Second, firm decisions concern-
ing compliance center strongly on economic and technical feasibility of the
behavioural prescriptions and the possibility of controls and sanctions. Firms
seldom take into account the environmental impact of their behaviour. Third,
the implementation of the permit. About 20 percent of the paint factories had
out of date permits, that were not to be renewed in the near future. Further-
more, many factories are not being audited regularly. In a substantial part of
the paint industry, the permit is not implemented and enforced properly. This
is partly a result of the passive attitude of the factories. Our fourth conclusion
is, a good permit is the best guarantee for a high level of compliance.
The general conclusion is, more than half of the paint factories comply with the
permit. Firm size, acceptance and the quality of the permit are the most import-
ant variables influcencing the degree of compliance.
6 The Environmental Audit
The environmental audit is a non-compulsory instrument. Just like the permit,
it is directed toward the environmental aspects of the individual production
processes. Because of its features (voluntary, elective) it can be seen as a coun-
terpart of the permit. The purpose of an environmental audit is to give factories
a more active role in preventing environmental problems. Most of the paint
factories are expected to have an environmental audit system implemented in
1995. If not, the environmental audit system, or certain parts of it, shall be
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required by law. The branch organization of paint factories strongly promotes
the use of environmental audit systems and has therefore conducted an intensive
information campaign. The national government supports the implementation
of environmental audit systems with a subsidy.
The research shows, a large proportion of the paint industry participates in the
implementation of the policy. Many factories are familiar with the publications
of the branch organization concerning the environmental audit system. Never-
theless, there is no evidence that the information campaign of the branch organ-
ization had any major impact on firm attitudes toward implementing environ-
mental audit systems. Most of the factories only made the first steps. A small
minority of the paint factories has an operational environmental audit system.
Their decision to respond positively to the appeal to implement the system, was
affected by the firms' expectations concerning the effects of the environmental
audit system on the environment. It may indicate that environmentally con-
scious firms prefer environmental audits. The most important variable for
explaining variance in compliance is firm size. Big factories have far more
experience with environmental audit systems than smaller ones. This was to be
expected because the former are more pushed to implement audit systems. In
addition, large factories have more environmental expertise, in the form of
environmental officials. These big firms are supposed to be committed to envi-
ronmental matters. Firmsize should therefore have a positive impact on compli-
ance levels.
The main conclusion is, the environmental audit system holds a lot of promise
but has not yet lived up to its promises. There is, as a result of a low degree
of compliance, still very little evidence as to environmental effects of the envi-
ronmental audit system.
7 The ban on cadmium
The Cadmiumbesluit is a compulsory instrument. It's main purpose is to pÍe-
vent cadmium emissions from products, such as paints, by prohibiting the usc
of cadmium in paints. It prohibits the use of cadmium in most paints. Thereforc
it can also be viewed as a product-centered instrument. The Cadmiumbesluitir,
carried out by the National government. The main implementation tasks involvq
informing target groups and monitoring compliance. .l
The Cadmiumbesluit was launched in 1991. For the paint industry it meant
most paint formulations had to be cadmiumfree. The research shows that
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Summary:  Paint  Industry and Environmental  Pol icy
1992 only very few firms still produced cadmium containing paints. Further-
more, there is evidence only very small amounts of these paints were produced.
Therefore the Cadmiumbesluit can be called a bie success. What factors caused
this success?
Firstly, long before the Cadmiumbesluit was launched. paint producers were
aware of the negative aspects of cadmium in paint. Secondly, in an early stage,
the paint industry succeeded in developing technically reliable alternatives Íor
cadmium containing paints. Launching the Cadmiumbesluit can be seen as the
last stage of a process of persuasion that began with the first preparatory talks
about the ban on cadmium eight years earlier. Therefore, the industry had been
given plenty of t ime to change their paint-formulations.
8 The convenant on environmental friendly paints
KWS 2000 deals with the environmental problems caused by VOC's in paints.
Its main pulpose is to decrease the VOC's in paint with 50 percent in 2000, by
means of a shift to VOC-poor paints. KWS 2000 is a 'convenant' between the
industry and national government. Convenants can be seen as alternate solutions
to regulation for solving environmental problems. KWS 2000 falls in the cat-
e_qory of non-compulsory instruments. Financial aid in sponsoring research,
gir, 'es paint producers additional incentives to develop VOC-poor paints.
Tlie main conclusion that can be drawn from our research is, KWS 2000 is not
much of a success. This is not because paint producers are not capable of
making VOC-poor paints, but merely because the market sales of those parnts
are too low to reach policy targets.
There are a number of reasons why sales of VOC-poor paints don't meet the
expectations. First of all, questions were raised concerning the quality of VOC-
poor paints. The quality of VOC-poor paints varies strongly with the use and
with the circumstances under which these paints are applied. The product is sti l l
in a developing phase. As a result, professional paint appliers, who in gencral
ion t want to take big risks with new products, take on an attitude of 'wait and
see'. Secondly, the contractors also stick to the old Íashioned paints, merely
because they are not well informed, or because the VOC-rich paints are less
expensive. A third reason for the low sales of VOC-poor paints are questions
about heir environmental consequences. There is discussion about the degree
to lvhich the new paints pose new environmental problems. Under some cir-
cunstances VOC-poor paints can cause water pollution. Others say the VOC-
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emissions of these paints are not substantially lower when the total product
lifecycle is taken into account. These questions strengthen the distrust among
buyers concerning VOC-poor paints.
Although it must be taken into account that KWS 2000 has been important to
develop alternatives for VOC-rich paints, it did so far, not succeed in furthering
the sales of VOC-poor paints. To reach that target stronger measures eem to
be necessary.
9 Comparing instruments
The final topics we raised were firstly, the infuence of instrument characteris-
tics on mean compliance levels and, secondly, instrument and target group
characteristics that, given the circumstances in the paint industry, most strongly
boost compliance
The first objective of comparing instruments is identifying instrument character-
istics relating to compliance by the target group. We did so by comparing mean
compliance levels of the four instruments we discussed earlier. The main con-
clusion must be the targetgroup complies better to compulsory instruments. We
found two explanations. First, the compulsory instruments have stronger bind-
ing capabilities than the non-compulsory instruments, mainly caused by the
weak juridical status of the non-compulsory instruments. Second, compulsory
instruments are older that non-compulsory instruments. Therefore the target
group is more used to, and aware of, the behavioural prescriptions in compul-
sory instruments.
The second question is answered by comparing three of the four instruments as
to their effects on compliance. We used an index of compliance based on the
compiance of four instruments and studied the effects of three instruments on
this proxy. The main conclusion is the environmental permit and information
campaigns induce more compliant behaviour than financial aid sponsoring
research. This finding can be specified by taking firm size into account. Small
factories tend to comply whatever the instrument, even though the permit and
the information campaign are most effective. Big factories, on the other hand,
seem uncontrollable. None of the three policy instruments have a significant
effect on compliance. Compliance seems to be an autonomous process. When
profitability is taken into account, it turns out that for low-profitable factories,
the permit is the most suitable instrument for generating compliance. When
































Summary: Paint Industry and Environmental Policy
effects on compliance levels. The location of companies was also introduced as
an intermediate variable. For factories within cities the permit does not pose
sufficient incentive to comply. Information-campaigns are also needed. Fac-
tories in relatively safe industrial zones profit most from good permits. This
analysis shows that no single policy instrument is most effective under all
circumstances. Firm characteristics, especially firm size and profitability strong-
ly moderate the outcomes. Therefore it is very important policymakers, when
choosing policy instruments, take into account the characteristics of the target
group and are aware of the interactions detected in this study.
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